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[T]he student of the “legal” must wrestle with how the “legal”
comes into recognizable being as a something discernibly
different from just what is going on, in general.
-Karl Llewellyn1
I. INTRODUCTION

Law’s interdisciplinary turn toward social sciences suggests a growing
realization that jurists may not be independently equipped to explain the
world in and upon which they act. But if law embraces empirical social
* PhD Princeton University, JD University of Southern California; Assistant Professor, Phoenix
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Francine Banner, Jay Kanassatega, Josh Cavinato and Kara
Hatfield for commenting on earlier drafts of this article, Associate Dean Keith Swisher for institutional
and substantive support, and Chase Walker and Lawton Jackson for valuable research assistance.
1. Karl Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49
YALE L. J. 1355, 1366 (1940).
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science for its usable output, it struggles to make sense of the more
interpretive disciplines such as anthropology. This has proven to be a major
setback for both law and anthropology and confounds the historically
productive rapport between the two fields stretching back more than a
century.2 While it may be tempting to conclude that today’s legal academic
misunderstands the interpretive turn in anthropology, that conclusion offers
little to facilitate a rapport of the kind badly needed today.
Instead, in this piece I wish to argue that legal scholars’ difficulty with
anthropology arises not from its interpretivism generally, but from its
particular approach that equates law with culture for what appears to be
methodological expediency. As I explain below, the equation that treats law
as culture permits the anthropologist to study law at a wide variety of
“locations” or “field sites”3 while sacrificing a distinction that is—even if
socially fabricated—of great significance to the people for and against whom
it operates. What this comes down to, then, is a confrontation between two
views: one that sees law as merely a variant of larger systems of symbol and
practice and a second that sees it as somehow exceptional—autonomous in
its operation and consequence in daily life. While this may share with other
accounts the conclusion of autonomy, it uses it differently.4 As some defend
or eulogize a putatively natural autonomy of law, I join positivists in viewing
legal autonomy as social fact—fabricated and maintained through
relationships between institutions and actors.5 My suggestion here, is that we
view law from the inside as autonomous because that is how most experience

2. See Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949–
1999, in LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 346–67 (Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005).
3. See, e.g., Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Discipline and Practice: “The Field” as Site, Method,
and Location in Anthropology, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL LOCATIONS: BOUNDARIES AND GROUNDS OF A
FIELD SCIENCE 2 (Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson eds., 1997).
4. Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES
976 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet ed., 2003):
It remains valuable to focus on what is distinctive to law—that it is, in most legal systems,
guidance through general rules; that it may involve an interaction of law-making and lawapplying institutions (e.g., courts applying the rules passed by legislatures); and that (in
common law systems) the application of rules will be done through a judicial system that
both authorizes judicial law-making and has important rules of stare decisis (rules of
hierarchy and rules about the way that later decisions are constrained by earlier decisions).
All of these features may contribute to a form of reasoning that is distinctive, if not entirely
autonomous.
Id.; see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the Semi-autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973); Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as
an Autonomous Discipline, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
5. Bix, supra note 4, at 977 (“As regards legal reasoning, ‘autonomy’ should be understood in a
relative way. No one has ever seriously claimed that law is a way of thinking entirely of its own category,
and legal reasoning, even when most autonomous, does not shun (for example) basic rules of logic and
inference. While there are times when the legal profession seems to depend on a language and a way of
thinking entirely foreign to common sense and common language, this is the only appearance of the
extremes of the practice.”).
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and navigate it under regimes of increasing global complexity and
expansiveness.6
This suggestion departs from current legal anthropology in an important
manner. To date, most work within the subfield has explored the meaning of
law to its ambient culture and society; it has focused upon the ways in which
law mediates social relations and becomes meaningful in everyday life.
Here, I wish to take the opposite approach of understanding culture and
society as understood from the perspective of legal rules and processes. The
goal in this effort is to understand the way rulemakers maintain the
provisional autonomy of the legal sphere, and this embraces a key
anthropological objective to depict institutions and practices from the
“native’s point of view”. 7 Since Malinowski’s initial fieldwork on tribal
crime in the Trobriand Islands, this goal has become the common
denominator of most ethnographic field research. And yet, it has not
prevented legal anthropologists from treating law perennially from the
outside. 8 That is because, among other things, its writers have become
preoccupied with the “spaces in between” social groups, cultures, and
epistemes. One result of this reflexivity has also been a preoccupation with
interfaces between disciplines: “where we stand and who are our ‘Others’?” 9
But, the dominance of this question has forestalled development of theories
and methods useful to academic law the way, notably, economics has been in
the development of tort theory. 10 However, this is not to say that
anthropology should be un-reflexive; its introspection has been necessary in
coming to grips with its dubious role in colonial projects past and present.
6. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13 (1986) (“Theories that ignore the structure of legal
argument for supposedly larger questions of history and society are therefore perverse. They ignore
questions about the internal character of legal argument, so their explanations are impoverished and
defective . . . . It was Oliver Wendell Holmes who argued most influentially, I think, for this kind of
‘external’ legal theory, the depressing history of social-theoretic jurisprudence in our century warns us
how wrong he was.”).
7. See Clifford Geertz, From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological
Understanding, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (3rd ed.
2000) [hereinafter Geertz I].
8. See BRONISLAW MALINOWKSI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); see also MARCUS
GEORGE E. & MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE 18 (1986)
(“Ethnography is a research process in which the anthropologist closely observes, records, and engages in
the daily life of another culture—an experience labeled as the fieldwork method—and then writes
accounts of this culture, emphasizing descriptive detail.”).
9. John Comaroff, Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology: Units of Study and Questions of
Theory, 8 J. OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES 143, 144 (1982) (“In my own view, there ought to be no
‘relationship’ between history and anthropology, since there should be no division to begin with. A theory
of society which is not also a theory of history, or vice versa, is hardly a theory at all.”); see also Rena
Lederman, Comparative “Research”: A Modest Proposal Concerning the Object of Ethics Regulation, 30
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW 319, 319 (2007).
10. See, e.g., John C. Moorehouse, Law and Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion,
62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 667–68 (1998).
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But productive self-evaluation and productivity are two different things.
Why then, should legal anthropology be productive and how can this be
gauged?
While the subfield takes as its key occupation the ethnographic or
ethnological study of law and law-like activity, I wish to understand its
productivity here in terms of positive influence upon formal law in both
scholastic and professional modalities.11 Thus, this article proceeds in four
stages to suggest that legal anthropology take greater stock of the provisional
autonomy of law. First, in Part II below, it briefly introduces the context and
gravity of the problem including missed opportunities to predict and forestall
recent incidents of large-scale injustice. This assertion relies upon an
understanding of law under global governance as occulted—a term I have
developed elsewhere to mean hidden behind increasingly global legal
knowledge and expertise—and upon the notion that ethnography of law,
nearly by definition, may have its ear to the ground ahead of looming
crises.12 Second, the article draws attention in Part III to early critical rapport
between the disciplines in three historic moments. Here, “historic” need not
be read as “in the past.” These moments present problems that are still very
current today in the debates about legal anthropological relevance. Showing
this, Part IV explores the problems of relevance in recent approaches to legal
anthropology and their solubility within modern legal practice and teaching.
Finally, borrowing from Latour’s seminal contribution to science and
technology studies, Part V presents the notion of legal black boxes with
recourse to their manifestation in the doctrinal law of torts.
II. LAW IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: COMPLEXITY, INFLUENCE,
OCCULTATION
The view of anthropology from the legal academy has never been more
significant. Over the past fifteen years, rules about global warfare, 13
financial markets,14 corporate citizenship,15 and regional governance16 have

11. Other empirical fields that have come to be influential upon law are less self-conscious of
distinctions between “pure” and “applied” research. Applied in this context is probably best replaced by
the term relevant.
12. Riaz Tejani, Crisis and Constitution: French Antiracism and Belonging in the New Legal Order of
Europe (May 10, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with Mudd
Library, Princeton University).
13. See, e.g., Ganesh Moorehouse, Counterinsurgency, The War On Terror, And The Laws Of War, 95
VA. L. REV. 1745 (2009); see also David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Fiona Haines, Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis
of the Aftermath of Disaster, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31 (2009).
15. E.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
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drastically evolved to have wider influence on private lives and bodies while
simultaneously appearing to fade from sight.17 More importantly, these rules
have changed largely with decreasing comment or resistance from lay
people.18 That faceless group, or “public,” has not only been rendered more
passive to the large scale development and enforcement of rules in global
context, it is often unaware or uninformed of them.19 As governance and
rulemaking become increasingly global and technologized in scope and form,
the public whose behavior is regulated enjoys less participation in and
understanding of the process. Legitimacy is maintained, however, by the
entrustment of rulemaking in the hands of increasingly specialized “experts”
whose knowledge is considered beyond the reach of most.20 Elsewhere, I
have written of the role such “occult” knowledge played in the demise of the
2005 European Constitution in France.21 There, increased regionalization of
norms and rulemaking left a significant gap between decision-making power
and its bases—a “democratic deficit” in the words of some.22
This being the case, fieldwork-based legal anthropology would appear
well poised to furnish advance insight on the local “realities” affected by
such global governance shifts. And in some cases, it has already furnished
such insight. However, the influence of these studies on mainstream law
16. See Nicholas Kulish & Paul Geitner, Euro Zone Crisis Boils as Leaders Fail to Signal New Steps,
N.Y. Times, May 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/europe/euro-crisis-intensifies-asleaders-bicker.html?pagewanted=all; see also Floyd Norris, As Europe’s Currency Union Frays,
Conspiracy Theories Fly, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/business/aseuropes-currency-union-frays-conspiracy-theories-fly.html?pagewanted=all.
17. One paradox of neo-liberal economic and social policies more generally. See, e.g., CAROL
GREENHOUSE, THE PARADOX OF RELEVANCE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
(2011) [hereinafter GREENHOUSE I].
18. Meant here in its descriptive sense, the phrase captures the vast population of citizens and residents
who go about their daily lives without the power to spontaneously act upon the structures and rules of
government. To deny that such a group exists, or to label them in less clear terms, is to contribute to their
invisibility. See also RONALD NIEZEN, PUBLIC JUSTICE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 1 (2010). A
similar awkwardness is necessary in the faceless notion of “publics,” “[P]ublics, however intangible, have
also become part of the social worlds of those whom it is possible to know intimately.”
19. See, e.g., Anthony Fowler & Michele Margolis, The Political Consequences of Uninformed Voters
(MIT Political Sci. Dep’t Research Paper No. 2011-12, 2011).
20. See, e.g., ARTHUR GOLDWAG, CULTS, CONSPIRACIES, AND SECRET SOCIETIES (2009). One index of
this development has been a rise in conspiracy theories. The World Wide Web abounds with sites
analyzing conspiracies behind the Kennedy assassinations, moon landing, and September 11th among
many others.
21. Tejani, supra note 12. Occult in this sense means hidden from view but for a select few, experts, or
elites. Unlike other forms of normativity premised upon self-dominance such as disciplinary power or
hegemony, occultation of law in these contexts is premised upon the “unknowability” of complex rules
and processes inscribed into legal doctrine. It remains whether unknowability is a proper object of
ethnographic study. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 1. I join Niezen’s view to “brake with the source of
anthropologists’ disciplinary identity by discussing social actors who are intangible, abstract, notoriously
unpredictable and largely unknowable.” Id.
22. DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64 (1979); see also DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL.,
EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 64 (2006).
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research and teaching has remained minor.23 This is unfortunate because
while anthropologists serve an important documentary and interpretive role
in late-modern,Western societies, their greatest potential contribution may be
to influence law and policy through accounts of everyday lives influenced by
and legitimating abstract decisions of which many run counter to
communities’ own economic and social interests.24
III. CRITICAL PREHISTORY: EVOLUTIONISM, LAW IN ACTION, AND LEGAL
REALISM
Today’s palpable gulf between anthropology and law, however, may be
exceptional. While the two were discrete in their conceptions of evidence
and methodology, these differences were once well-articulated and
productive. Sociocultural anthropology emerged and grew largely on the
basis of ethnological and ethnographic studies of norms and dispute
resolution so that law, in short, fueled the furnace of the burgeoning new
“science of culture.”25 Meanwhile, those early studies were conducted by
trained jurists and came to influence the development of hard law in the new
metropolitan nation-states. 26 Nations and nationalism emerged as new
“imagined” or “represented communities” and early legal anthropology
helped define the boundary between metropolitan subjects of history and
their “Others” held over from a bygone era.27 At the same time, ethnography
was rendered more important by calls to understand law in movement rather
than as static doctrine. Three watershed moments in this early rapport are
often noted: (1) the popularization of evolutionism in law by Sir Henry
Maine; (2) the rupture between law in books and law in action signaled by
Roscoe Pound; and (3) the elucidation of legal realism via the “law jobs” of
Karl Llewellyn. Each of these figures was a legal scholar who brought
sociocultural insight about law back into the legal academy in ways still
visible today.

23. See Annalise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of
Interdisciplinarity U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (1994). For some, this feeling is mutual. See LAWRENCE ROSEN,
LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION, 63 (2006) (“[M]any American scholars have undeniable prejudice
against law. Like their countrymen, they tend to think of law as a domain of specialists, rife with strange
terminology and far from disinterested maneuvering.”)
24. See David Runciman, Why Do People Vote Against Their Own Self Interest?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8474611.stm; see also Charles Simic, Age of Ignorance, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS BLOG, (March 20, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/mar/20/age-ofignorance/.
25. George Peter Murdock, The Science of Culture, 34 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 200 (1932).
26. This was possible as the new Westphalian international order assumed each nation would be
governed by one state with one law, and that each state would be legitimated by one nation.
27. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1983); JOHN KELLY & MARTHA KAPLAN,
REPRESENTED COMMUNITIES: FIJI AND WORLD DECOLONIZATION (2001).
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A. Maine
Henry Maine is sometimes considered the foundational legal
anthropologist—a primacy indicative of his historicity and wide scholarly
exposure.28 He was the first Anglos-Saxon jurist to formally analyze South
Asian legal norms, and his “status to contract” theory came to typify the
evolutionist thinking that European metropolitan law was more advanced in
form and systematicity than its counterparts among non-Western peoples.29
But this assertion was widely discredited even as it came to be reinvoked
time and again in contract law casebooks.30 Today, few wish to support the
overt racialism underpinning evolution; nevertheless, Maine continues to be
reinvoked with some frequency.
One of the greater lessons found in revisitations of Maine may be the
apparent dislike he harbored for legal practice.31 Annalise Riles has written
that such disdain is suggestive of Maine’s great consciousness of
“disciplinarity”—the role that anthropology could play in conversations with
law on the topic of context and culture.32 We might, however, also view it as
indicative of something deeper: legal anthropology’s early difficulty with
expertise. Viewed in certain perspective, Maine illustrates the beginning of a
rift between legal culture and profession—a foundational preference to view
and understand law at sites removed from the locus of metropolitan legal
practice in his time. Indeed, his acceptance of an administrative post in India
subsequent to bar admission suggests that he preferred the ethnological
theorization afforded by colonial positioning over head-to-head interlocution
at the English bar.33
This preference was more than conceptual; it was practical. As with the
pursuit of dual studies in law and anthropology today, the demands of legal
profession and the demands of ethnographic fieldwork can become mutually
exclusive. For Maine to compose Ancient Law, his position in India would
be far more consequential than one among the English courts. And yet, what
did this mean for professional relevance of his work and later legal
anthropologies following it? Would there be a way to create relevant theory
on legal culture while developing a keen understanding of the way law is
28. See Carol Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE
L. J. 1631, 1632 (1998); JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 3 (1990).
29. See, e.g., NORBERT ROULAND, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 228–29 (Phillippe Planel trans., 1994).
30. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (1986).
31. Riles, supra note 23, at 608.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 608–09. Maine’s role in British colonial administration saw him engaged in governance
rather than advocacy.
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practiced in any given context or are these epistemologies inherently
insoluble? And once such appreciation was cultivated, to what extent would
it be generalizable in the way jurists hope cultural meta-theory to be?
Even more fundamentally, what would be the role of generalizability
across these disciplines? Legal anthropology has since eschewed sweeping
meta-theory—notions that try to explain globally the distribution of other
notions—of the kind Maine promulgated. Meanwhile, academic law has
further embraced such sweeping theories when plausible with open arms in a
way that partakes of the interdisciplinarity I began with above. 34 But, if
confirmation of such theories in science occurs through experimentation and
observation, in law it occurs through through stable rule creation and
enforcement. Meta-theory in law beyond a certain threshold of plausibility,
therefore, is always “confirmed” when it creates the worlds into which it is
born.
While Maine’s documented legacy has been the influence of “status to
contract” in casebook introductions and law and society article footnotes, we
might view him here as his own symbol for the early practical
incommensurability between legal culture and profession among
anthropological writings on law.
B. Pound
Roscoe Pound’s 1910 article “Law in Books and Law in Action”
introduced a second seminal moment.35 There, Pound argued that law was
drastically more than the sum of its doctrines and rather entailed (and thus
required study of) law as practiced and lived by its constituents. 36 The
concept expanded the venues of law to include nondoctrinal—though still
formal—settings like courtrooms, firms, legislatures, clinics, police
precincts, and so on.37
For Pound, this move was animated by a belief that access to American
justice was bifurcating along class lines.38 “The malefactor of means,” he
wrote, “the rogue who has an organization of rogues behind him to provide a
lawyer and amount of habeas corpus has the benefit of law in the books.”39
34. See, e.g., Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase
Theorem, 116 ECON. J. 223, 223–45 (2006). Ronald Coase’s “irrelevance theorem” has been widely
accepted and promoted as a rationale behind economic jurisprudence in Tort Law. See R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960).
35. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
36. Id.
37. John Hanson & Michael McCann, Situational Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1389 (2008).
38. Pound, supra note 35, at 17.
39. Id. (“The fact remains, however, that the attempt of the books to compel prosecutors to use only a
case-knife is failing. They will use the pickaxe in practice, and until the law has evolved some device by
which they may use it in all cases the weak and friendless and lowly will be at a practical disadvantage,
despite legal theory.”).
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Inverting American revolutionary suspicions of monarchic justice—in which
a sovereign adjudicator could be arbitrary and irreproachable—Pound decries
the arbitrariness of textualized legal rules for their susceptibility to creative,
expert wielders. The law of “books” is a luxury out of reach to the pauper,
and a tool for manipulation and cunning for the wealthy. Such inequality
demanded that this new distinction between formal and applied law be better
understood within the academy and the profession. Pound’s classed vision of
justice is instructive today. Formalized law, it holds, is not accessible to
laypersons, and is, rather, mediated by a tier of experts trained in the
language and posture of legal argumentation. In today’s world, many hold a
reinverted view of justice wherein formal rules generally ensnare the
common person, while the exceptional person of means is thought to receive
“special treatment” or “celebrity justice.”40
The rift between books and action opened up studies of law to “law in
society.” Though the modern trend in legal anthropology has been to place
heavier emphasis on the “society” side of this formulation, law in action
carried a sense—evident in Pound’s account—that formal institutions still
remained the key framework through which to view “action.” While one
major strand in legal anthropology influenced by the work of Michel
Foucault would come to view action elsewhere, this original formulation of
law in action seems to have influenced a narrow group of modern legal
anthropologists who successfully steer close to the shores of legal
institutions.
One example may be Law and Community in Three American Towns, an
illuminating collaboration by Greenhouse, Yngvesson, and Engel. 41
Separately, the authors conducted and drew up ethnographic field studies in
American small towns in the 1980s.42 The choice of field sites allowed them
to observe legal behavior among residents both at the early stage of dispute
formation and choice to litigate, as well as at the later stages of court filing
and appearances. But these sites also allow larger observations about the
changing nature of small town life in America in an era of
deindustrialization, increased immigration, and rapid population flight from
rural to urban life. Latour has offered another impressive update on “law in
action” in his 2010 study of the French Conseil d’Etat.43 There, he observed
sessions of the Conseil and drew observations about its reasoning and
40. See, e.g., Theodore J. Boutrous & Michael H. Dore, Celebrity Justice: A New Double Standard, 22
COMM. LAW. 3 (2004); see also Jared Chamberlain et al., Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses,
Psychological Theory and Empirical Research, 3 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551 (2006).
41. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS (1994)
[hereinafter GREENHOUSE II].
42. Id.
43. BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT (2009).
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assumptions, all in a period in which French national legal culture was
undergoing dramatic changes.44 These examples are exceptional in that they
remain more “institutional” in choice of field site than much legal
anthropological empirical work today. They can be considered illustrative of
the law in action influence on anthropology, but that influence remains
marginal with a greater number of field studies today aimed at “law-like”
behavior.
C. Llewellyn
If Maine and Pound highlighted the problem of expertise, Karl Llewellyn
stood for a plausible solution: the placement of law and law-like activity
along a single spectrum of social practice. This conceptual merger was
articulated in his ethnographic collaboration with anthropologist E. Adamson
Hoebel.45 There, Llewellyn and Hoebel describe what they term the “law
jobs,” the diffuse legal practices spread among various actors in the
Cheyenne tribes.46 Written in 1941, the work explores law in its diffuse loci
as something belonging to an entire tribe rather than just its experts.47
The “law-jobs” were comprised of five elements that, he felt,
transcended all legal contexts from ancient to modern. 48 These included
what Llewellyn termed: (1) disposition of trouble-cases; (2) preventive
channeling and reorientation of conduct and expectations; (3) allocation of
authority and arrangement of procedures which legitimatize action as being
authoritative; and (4) the net organization of the group as a whole to provide
direction and incentive.49 But interestingly, despite typology of these diffuse
behaviors, Llewellyn did not challenge a key distinction about law as, at
once, more grave and more violent than mere customary norms. “Normative
generalization,” he wrote, “is part of what goes to generate and to make up
the ‘legal’; it is not the whole . . . . It must be more; it reaches beyond the
normation of oughtness into the imperative of mustness.” 50 The whole
purpose of this conversion from norm to rule, we learn, is to secure the
reproduction of the society against anomic forces of individualism, deviance,
and so forth.

44. Id.
45. See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL & KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW
(1941).
46. Id.; see generally Llewellyn, supra note 1.
47. HOEBEL & LLEWELLYN, supra note 45.
48. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1374 (“[T]he law-jobs hold, as basic functions, for every human
group . . . . They are implicit in the concept of ‘groupness.’”).
49. Id. at 1373.
50. Id. at 1364.
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The law-jobs seem to augur the kind of thinking later addressed by
Foucault via “disciplinary power.” 51 But Llewellyn and Hoebel offer an
account where law meets legal culture in a way that is optimistic about both
human nature and the sophistication of Cherokee problem solving.52 Later,
Foucault provides an explanation for the coexistence of State and
interpersonal power relations in a way meant to capture a human drive for
coercion. The two overlap in the implicit recognition of the role of legal
culture in law’s efficiency. Given this overlap, it might appear lawyers and
anthropologists would have much to talk about.
Yet, while readings of both Llewellyn and Foucault may begin at a
common locus of “legal culture,” they quickly veer off in different and
influential directions. Disciplinary power gave rise to the practice in social
sciences of studying law far from its sources of emanation. Beginning in the
1970s and continuing up to the present, ethnographers took the study of law
to contexts as disparate as urban gangs, punk music scenes, and biomedical
engineering. At all of these sites, ethnographers argued, one could witness
the influence of and negotiation with “the law.” Indeed, it began to appear
that the true substance of the law—its raw material—lay simply in day-to-day
human relations. The popularity of sociocultural studies of law premised
upon disciplinary power might be read as one example of the wider success
and influence of first wave legal realism.53
Ongoing interest in Maine, Pound, and Llewellyn paints a promising
picture of the sociocultural study of law within the legal academy.54 Though
none were trained anthropologists, each championed ethnological and
ethnographic approaches to support propositions about the law and the
reinsertion of those approaches into studies of Anglo-American legal
doctrine. Few if any subsequent thinkers have approached the integrated
influence of these figures. Instead, sociocultural legal studies have come to
generate rich narratives of law in the “local” context but rarely directed
lessons from those back toward law as a practice or profession.

51. See, e.g., id. at 1392 (“In the main, machinery ‘legal’ in character, and personnel ‘official’ in
character, have best potentiality for accomplishing the ‘law-jobs.’ But rarely, in any culture, and never in
a culture both developed and mobile, can official ‘legal’ machinery and personnel accomplish the whole
of those jobs. What is wanted is an on-going optimum balance, keeping in the hands of the official ‘legal’
machinery and personnel, and well-handled by them, so much as they can best handle.”).
52. Id at 1373.
53. Bix, supra note 4, at 980.
54. All three of these men are extraordinarily accomplished scholars. Maine held a professorship in
jurisprudence and law at Oxford and Cambridge, Pound taught law at Northwestern and Chicago and
became Dean at Harvard Law School, and Llewellyn taught law at Yale, Columbia, and Chicago.
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANCE
In her trenchant work, The Paradox of Relevance,55 Carol Greenhouse
explores the problem of relevance in anthropology amid its contemporary
sociopolitical context. There, she posits that the dilemma results not from
inherent disciplinary turns but rather from the object of ethnography shifting
away from collective notions of meaning and “Self” toward increasingly
individualized forms of belonging. 56 A similar observation might now be
drawn about law under new regimes of global governance. 57 Changes in
legal cultural conditions have eschewed the community bases of norms and
emphasized abstract institutions, processes, and administration. Far reaching
global warfare and financial collapse have been key products of this, and
each was enabled by the cultural shift Greenhouse describes. By their very
nature, they have escaped anticipation and description by contemporary legal
ethnographic fieldwork and necessitate a reorentiation of the kind for which
this article advocates. To be more specific, the subfield might now include in
its prospective audience judges, lawyers, and lawmakers—experts whom it
might take in new orientations as its native interlocutors.
In order to do this, the it must contend with one particular dilemma. On
one hand, legal anthropology tends to hold that law is not just the domain and
material of governmental institutions and their experts, and rather the entire
complex of norms and control that interleave the contextual society. On the
other hand, laypersons, particularly those within the complex urban societies
to which legal anthropologists often look when they speak about law,
generally do not see law in this way. Instead, they look to it as very much
the province of trained and skilled experts. Whether they should or not is a
separate matter; so long as anthropology—ethnography, to be precise—is a
descriptive endeavor, it must take stock of the experience of everyday actors.
Significantly, those individuals do not typically experience law as “diffuse”
in the way that legal anthropology would expect them to.
This is, at bottom, a problem of “seeing.”58 While we would not often
admit it, legal anthropologists by and large are viewing law from the
55. GREENHOUSE I, supra note 17.
56. See id. at 34 (“[T]he calls for relevance could only make more pressing the question of what
relevance could actually mean in practice . . . . The fact that relevance was presented as a mediating path
in relation to anthropology’s internal debates implied that anthropologists had only themselves to blame if
the public overwhelmingly communicated through other channels. In retrospect, this accusation misses
the mark. It was politics that abandoned society as social—the basis of social security—and failed the
people with whom anthropologists most readily identified, that is, minority communities at the social
margins.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
57. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 4 (“[T]he institutions of global governance are built upon ideas of
effecting change among non-compliant peoples in the interest of furthering cosmopolitan values of peace
and development.”).
58. See, e.g., Riaz Tejani, The Vanishing Point: Humanity, Vision, and Value Theory in the Age of
Economic Globalization, 20 ALTERNATE ROUTES 132 (2004) (suggesting that the conceptual distinction
between humans and their others is based upon the visualization of nature as exchange value).
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outside—what they sometimes call the etic perspective.59 That is, the role of
the ethnographer in legal contexts, even those far from the institutions of
sovereign power, is less one of participant and more one of observer.
Almost by definition, such contexts do not lend themselves to real
“participation” as would other kinds of fieldwork. The researcher is usually
not a stakeholder in the proceedings or resolution, nor is she typically an
advocate or adjudicator. 60 So, while legal anthropology can often only
observe law in core contexts such as these “from the margins,” it has been
adept at observing fast evolving or remote “law-like” situations. Our
accounts of the margins, interstices, and remote occurrences of law and lawlike activity require that we be honest about the way law really works, for
better and for worse, in ways that regulate everyday behavior.
A first step in this direction might be to provisionally redefine the legal
“native” as expert, and to therefore take the “expert’s point of view.” There,
from the perspective of legally trained and licensed law practitioner or
adjudicator, law is not “everywhere you find it.” More to the point, for these
actors, a world of difference exists between “law” on one hand and “lawlike” on the other. Practice is geared toward specific problems. Problems
must be solved. Solutions come with outcomes. Outcomes impact lives.
And the path between each of these is paved with rules, codes, procedures,
forms, argument structures, and patterns of reasoning. Each of these in most
cases, have been learned or experienced through years of law school training,
months of bar preparation, threshold evaluation in one bar examination or
more, and finally the practical experience of a kind only licensed individuals
are permitted to attain. Reckoning with these practicalities has remained thin
in legal anthropological writing. Perhaps one reason is that few scholars
know firsthand the exigencies of both fieldwork and legal practice, or their
divergences on such integral concepts as evidence.

59. See Geertz I, supra note 7, at 56.
60. See, e.g., James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 178
(Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005). There, the author observing a legal proceeding on the very sensitive topic
of American Indian tribal status could only watch from the audience as the tribe’s advocates pled their
case before a judge. Since Clifford was not an anthropologist but rather a historian, his work attempted
fieldwork but stopped short of talking to people involved in the trial. Fieldwork is not generally a method
of historiography, and one wonders if the partiality of Clifford’s method resulted more from practical
limitations about observing law in context than from a real, preformulated, disciplinary outlook on what
should be done in such contexts. There are rare exceptions to this. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1989) (author describing his first
court appearance on behalf of an Indian tribe following his own legal training).
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A. Reading Evidence: Interpretivism, Reflexivity, Comparativism
Within sociocultural anthropology, evidence often consists of field notes
and interview transcripts. By those two means, researchers learn of
informant worldviews based upon what they are told and shown. With
respect to legal anthropology, the most apparent problem with this approach
under new complex legal regimes is that laypersons increasingly do not know
where legal rules originate or how they are applied. In tribal societies—the
inaugural object of legal anthropology—law emerged from customary norms
to become formalized as legal rules in what Paul Bohannan famously called
“double institutionalization.”61 Today, in many instances, legal rules migrate.
They are developed from institutions outward, or are borrowed from one
community and applied to another. The interaction and impact of such rules
with and upon anthropological informants may not be accurately captured by
the dominant approach of interpretivism—the capturing of native
interpretations of local worlds. Limited reception of legal anthropology
within the legal academy today may well be rooted in this insufficiency.
More broadly, the history of ethnographic empiricism—the record to
which interpretivism responds—has been problematic and destabilizing. At
its origin, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century by colonial missionaries.62 Many of these missionaries
sought to document and learn native languages and belief systems, often with
the aim of fostering rapport and religious conversion. 63 Through written
correspondence, these early ethnographers would transmit notes back to
scholars in English or French universities who then drew up sweeping
theories about “primitive man” based on cross-cultural comparison or
ethnology.64
Because of this dubious history, ethnographic empiricism has long
carried the stain of colonialism. Not only were its early insights used to
better “know” the native peoples whom it dominated, they were often

61. See Paul Bohannon, The Differing Realms of Law, in LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT 43–56 (Paul Bohannon ed., 1967).
62. See George W. Stocking, Jr., Colonial Situations, in COLONIAL SITUATIONS: ESSAYS ON THE
CONTEXTUALIZATIONS OF ETHNOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE 3, 4 (1991) [hereinafter Colonial Situations]; see
also John Cinnamon, Missionary Expertise, Social Science, and the Uses of Ethnographic Knowledge in
Colonial Gabon, 6 HIST. IN AFR. 413 (2006).
63. See Colonial Situations, supra note 62, at 4.
64. See GEORGE W. STOCKING, JR., AFTER TYLOR: BRITISH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1888–1951, at 15
(1995).
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utilized in their domination as well. 65 But in the interwar and postwar
periods, the goal of ethnography shifted from surveillance and
documentation toward advocacy. It sought to defend native beliefs and
practices on the eve of their apparent disappearance under colonial contact
and pressure.66
With this new prioritization of native life came a belief in the internal
logic and wisdom of native worldviews. Such worldviews, and their
understanding through ever-closer approximation of local interpretation,
came to be called interpretivism. Interpretive anthropology viewed culture as
native text, constantly undergoing interpretation and reinscription with
meaning. This line of thought later spawned cultural studies—a less
empiricist and more far-reaching field interested in the semiology of Western
popular and ethnic culture. The powerful influence of interpretive
anthropology on knowledge production may have limited the uptake of new
accounts in related applied disciplines.67
In one of the great fleeting moments of rapport between law and
anthropology, Clifford Geertz delivered a series of lectures at Yale that
eventually became the content for his key essay Local Knowledge.68 There,
Geertz grappled with the cold relations between law and anthropology,
attempting to reconcile them with recourse to law’s anthropological
tendencies.69 Comparing the concepts of haqq, dharma, and adat found in
the Arab, Hindu, and Malay cultures, respectively, Geertz tells the Yale
audience that in each of these concepts lies the conceptual merger of fact and
law that always already entails the intimacy of law and culture.70 Law from

65. See generally TALAL ASAD, ANTHROPOLOGY & THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (1973) (Talal Asad
ed., 1979) (discussing the ways in which anthropological thinking and practice have been affected by
British colonialism);
see also Diane Lewis, Anthropology and Colonialism, 14 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY, no. 5, Dec. 1973, at 582 (“Since anthropology emerged along with the expansion of
Europe and the colonization of the non-Western world, anthropologists found themselves participants in
the colonial system which organized relationships between Westerners and non-Westerners. It is, perhaps,
more than a coincidence that a methodological stance, that of the outsider, and a methodological approach,
‘objectivity’ developed which in retrospect seem to have been influenced by, and in turn to have
supported, the colonial system.”).
66. See, e.g., Claude Levi-Strauss, Race and History, in 2 STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1976). This
work was originally delivered as a lecture to UNESCO.
67. See MARCUS & FISCHER, supra note 10, at xi (noting a “marked decline of government interest in,
and support for, research in a number of fields, including anthropology”).
68. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1983) [hereinafter Geertz II].
69. Id.
70. See id. at 214–15:
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the native’s point of view is a cosmology in which norms and the factual
“world” upon which they act are linked. To be part of any local world, in
this way, is to be a subject of its rules. Geertz gives as example a case in
which one Indonesian tribesman name Regreg loses his wife to a man from
another village.71 Because of the strain this puts on him, Regreg refuses to
serve on the chiefly council governing the tribe at a time when he would be
otherwise compelled to do so.72 It is his turn, and there is no contemplated
alternative to service.73 Yet, he has neither the mind nor motivation to serve,
leading in turn to further agony.74 “Refusal,” we are told, “is tantamount to
resigning not just from the village but from the human race.”75 Construal of
the world in terms sanctioned by the prevailing norms of any one locality
becomes, in short, requisite to worldly existence. Presenting this insight to a
law school audience, Geertz fulfilled the role that he would become most
respected for: ambassador between the disciplines. He was only the second
anthropologist invited to speak in the Storrs Lecture Series,76 and had, just by
“being there”, helped signal the importance of culture to law recognized at

[M]y intent has not been, as I mentioned earlier, to compress Islamic, Indic, and Malaysian
notions about the interconnections of norms and happenings into some handbook for ex
patria litigants but to demonstrate that they are notions. The main approaches to
comparative law—that which sees its task as one of contrasting rule structures one to the
next and that which sees it as one of contrasting different processes of dispute resolution in
different societies—both seem to me rather to miss this point: the first through an
overautonomous view of law as a separate and self-contained “legal system” struggling to
defend its analytic integrity in the face of the conceptual and moral sloppiness of ordinary
life; the second through an overpolitical view of it as an undifferentiated, pragmatically
ordered collection of social devices for advancing interests and managing power conflicts.
Whether the adjudicative styles that gather around the Anschauungen projected by ḥaqq,
dharma, and adat are properly to be called “law” or not (the rule buffs will find them too
informal, the dispute buffs too abstract) is of minor importance; though I, myself, would
want to do so. What matters is that their imaginative power not be obscured. They do not
just regulate behavior, they construe it.
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
71. See id. at 176.
72. See id. at 176–77.
73. See id. at 177.
74. See id.
75. See Geertz II, supra note 68, at 177:
You lose your house-land, for that is village-owned here, and become a vagrant. You lose
your right to enter the village temples, and thus are cut off from contact with the gods. You
lose, of course, your political rights—seat on the council, participation in public events,
claims to public assistance, use of public property, all matters of great substance here; you
lose your rank, your inherited place in the castelike order of regard, a matter of even greater
substance. And beyond that, you lose the whole social world, for no one in the village may
speak to you on pain of fine. It is not precisely capital punishment. But for the Balinese,
who have a proverb, ‘to leave the community of agreement [adat, a sovereign word whose
ambiguities I shall be returning to at some length later on] is to lie down and die,’ it is the
next best thing to it.
Id.
76. The Storrs Lecture Series, one of Yale Law School's oldest and most prestigious lecture programs,
was established in 1889. These annual lectures are given by an American or foreign jurist or scholar who
is not ordinarily a member of the regular faculty of the Law School.
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one of the highest disciplinary levels. 77 And yet, likely for the reasons
addressed below, the luster of the moment quickly faded and with it, the
influence of interpretive anthropology on legal scholarship.78
Three key tenets of interpretive anthropology’s empirical approach may
have posed a problem for legal scholars. First is the notion that
ethnographers are describing their object legal cultures from within. This
softens the empirical approach to describe not simply what the researcher
sees, but local interpretations of what is being seen. From inside the
fieldwork project, this mandate is incredibly challenging and fruitful. It
requires the researcher to attempt to delve into the native mindset, its
Anschauungen to echo Geertz’s teutonism.79 Even if this goal is never fully
achieved, its pursuit is what leads to some of the greatest insights in the
fieldwork endeavor.80
But lawyers talk to people in their own way. The interview is as
important to their enterprise as it is to ethnography, albeit within a different
modality and set of goals.
To an Anglo-American lawyer, client
communication is not only fundamental; it is highly stylized to illicit the
“right” information that serves the case. Meanwhile the ethnographer’s
interview may actually be designed to illicit the “wrong” information—the
kind of material that will open up unexpected avenues of inquiry in a
potentially endless string of questioning whose real object is an entire
cultural or sub-cultural panoramic. And, in some sense, lawyers are “better”
at talking to people. Their speech is goal-oriented and measured and often
comes at times when their interlocutors are suffering from a dilemma which
they are positioned to solve. Ethnographers ask tough questions, but these
are typically experienced by interviewees—often by design—as open-ended
and ignorant. Put otherwise, if the interview in professional law and field
ethnography can be properly compared, the former sees the lawyer in the role
of expert while the latter sees the informant as expert. The ethnographer,
meanwhile, and in particular when approaching legal customs and
institutions, must operate as a layperson.
Comparison of these professional archetype roles leads to one possible
conclusion; that lawyers are, by training, skeptical of what they are told when
it comes unstructured and unmediated by their own questioning. This
possibility becomes most credible in light of Geertz’s fact-law continuum;

77. Max Gluckman was the first. See Riles, supra note 23, at 637.
78. See id.; see also GREENHOUSE I, supra note 17, at 18 (“Ethnography’s literariness became an object
of struggle and an icon of political struggles beyond the discipline . . . .”).
79. See Geertz II, supra note 68, at 232.
80. Most admit that this goal is rarely if ever “achieved.”
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that is, law does not simply act on reality, it structures it.81 But, while this
possibility is critical, it is not necessarily relevant.
Here are, then, two key distinctions between the lawyer and the
ethnographer of law. First is the role of expert that the lawyer assumes in
interacting with its informant and the opposite role of layperson that the
fieldworker properly assumes in interacting with its informant. Second is the
goal-orientation motivating a lawyer’s often formal or stylized speech versus
the ethnographer’s open-ended questioning. Given these, why would
lawyers read interpretive anthropologies that point out a social
constructivism in which they have already been self-consciously engaged?
Another potential difficulty of late-modern anthropology may be the
priority granted to reflexivity. This introspection has brought great
advancements by situating the researcher in relation to her object of study
and her audience and by attending to doubts raised by that situation. It has
produced insight on the fieldworker’s own motives and experience, and has
made almost every ethnographic project a comparative one. Nevertheless,
reflexivity’s prevalence in empirical anthropology has a limiting effect on the
uptake of ethnographic research by lawyers and law scholars because this
presents a problem of generalizability for legal academics. It marks
qualitative research with a particularism unique to this or that author or his or
her field site. Meanwhile, law must itself continually struggle with the
generality and particularity of its own principles—especially visible below in
the normative modality of tort law.
Finally a third potential dilemma to that uptake may be comparativism.
This will sound heretical to some; one very succinct definition of legal
anthropology pegs the discipline as the ethnographic and cross-cultural study
of norms and dispute resolution.82 To consider as a limitation the “crosscultural” element of this study is to potentially devalue one of its most
distinguishing traits. It is also to discourage unparalleled opportunities for
international and trans-regional studies of legal culture. For purposes of
understanding recent developments such as global governance and regional
integration, such discouragement may seem obscurantist. But hypotheses on
this question do not presumptively translate to other fields such as social
movements or global politics. In those arenas, the comparative lessons from
legal anthropology have made greater impact and enjoyed warmer reception.
In the discrete community of legal academics, meanwhile, comparative legal
culture enjoys no greater magnanimity than comparative law itself.
Comparative law and legal anthropology have shared the common
methodological approach of looking beyond the researcher’s own cultural
and linguistic context. While the latter has been based in ethnographic
81. See Geertz II, supra note 68, at 170; see also ROSEN, supra note 23, at 9.
82. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY IN AN
AMERICAN TOWN 28 (1986).
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fieldwork over time in the ways described above, the former takes, as its
object of study, not legal communities so much as legal doctrines and
concepts compared across cultural frontiers.83 At a high level of generality,
this has entailed comparison of principles in the various world legal systems:
Common, Civil, Islamic, Soviet, Hindu, and Chinese Law. But, from the
perspective of the legal ethnographer, pure comparative law has the readily
identifiable weakness of decontextualization. The comparative jurist looks to
rules and principles on a given subject within two or more legal communities
and stands those in relation to one another. 84 The ethnographic field
researcher enters and interacts with the communities constituted by those
rules and principles to glean their dynamic meanings in people’s daily life.85
Each draws conclusions based on their research, and presumably wishes for
those conclusions to enlighten the audiences they intended.
Further, comparative law has experienced only limited acceptance in
mainstream legal scholarship and teaching. One reason for this, which
confronts legal anthropology as well, is the perennial suspicion that lessons
offered by contexts afield are of little use to law students and represent only
pet research interests of their instructors. How, some would ask, does
understanding how the qadi (judge) of Islamic law reaches a decision help to
determine, influence, or construe the jurisprudence of Anglo-American
judges?86 Similarly, the reflexive, social science response might ask why
insight on Anglo-American jurisprudence must be the benchmark for the
relevance of accounts of Islamic justice. These counter-questions reflect a
dispute between scholarship’sprofessional use value, and its exceptional role
as knowledge “for its own sake.” The former demands our research be wellgrounded and engaged but renders it susceptible to “market” demands for
something less like knowledge and more like “information.” The latter
shields our research from market-driven need, but obviates the ethical
imperative of relevance.
B. Law Versus “Law-Like” Activity
Anthropology has struggled to properly characterize law for much of its
history. Its difficulties began with the dubious partnership between research
and political subjugation. Early ethnological work drawing on missionary
ethnography carried an important gravitas not just among the developing
83. See Annelise Riles, Introduction: The Projects of Comparison, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1, 5 n.12 (2001).
84. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (2006).
85. Moore, supra note 4, at 745.
86. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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social sciences, but among the life sciences as well. Conclusions about
“Man’s” evolutionary past were drawn from cultural observations among
“primitive” peoples of the global East and South, as well as native America.
The relevance of the discipline lay in its offering of lessons on human
essences—the natural tendencies of mankind underpinning all other
scientific, industrial, and artistic pursuits. The evolutionist agenda gave way
slowly—markedly between the two World Wars thanks to increased crosscultural contact—to a preservationist one. Whatever insights primitive
people and their cultures could supply, they would soon vanish and thus
needed to be documented if not “salvaged.”87
Finally, beginning in the 1960s and coinciding with human migration to
metropolitan countries, wars of decolonization, and civil rights movements
notably in the United States and England, sociocultural anthropology turned
increasingly to its own metropolitan, urban contexts.88 In this move, it could
offer in-depth, longitudinal, qualitative accounts of changes in metropolitan
societies brought on by the increased heteroglossia of multicultural urban
life.89 But, as this development unfolded, a new problem arose: to the extent
that anthropology was now turned toward Western, urban society, and to the
extent that its method had evolved to become “participant-observation,”
what, if anything, could it offer empirically that was not already available
through neighboring fields like urban sociology, or gonzo journalism? And
more specifically, was the provision of empirical data any longer its concern?
For some associated with the interpretivism already described, the answer
was ‘no’. For them, anthropology was to henceforth work as a humanities
discipline. Unlike literature, it would read cultural practices as text. Unlike
history, it would treat people’s narratives as their archives.
For the subfield of legal anthropology, the turn to metropolitan or global
society and concurrent humanization of the discipline and its methods has
been challenging. Ethnographic fieldwork no longer offers the potential of
putative “eureka!” insights it once might have. Few expect to deduce a
unified theory of justice or fairness from tribal dispute resolution in the
remote Amazon—first, because ethnography has left few stones unturned
and few tribes unchanged; and second, because unified social theory has left
the agenda almost everywhere.90 Further, studies of “complex” societies call
for a different approach than did the study of “primitive” ones. For Levi-

87. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
88. See Moore, supra note 4.
89. See generally MIKHAIL BAHKTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 67
(1982). Heteroglossia is Bahktin’s term for the multiplicity of national languages presented in the literary
novel form.
90. Chagnon’s famous study of the Yanomamo in Venezuela has become a symbol for these excesses.
Chagnon portrayed the tribe as one of the last “untouched” peoples, but his critics accused him of
infecting the Yanomamo with measles, misrepresenting their practices, and collaborating with government
officials in their subjugation. See PATRICK TIERNEY, DARKNESS IN EL DORADO 10 (2000).
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Strauss among the tribes of the Brazilian Amazon, the pen and notepad were
markers of an ingenious literary magic of which no local chief was in
possession.91 The anthropologist, for better and for worse in such contexts,
was his or her own kind of shaman. Even if he was ignorant of local
practices, he approached them from a correlative position of expertise. For
today’s urban legal ethnographer there is little such parity of position within
the larger framework of legal systems and institutions. Unless trained in the
same venues as metropolitan jurists, the ethnographer must approach these
actors from a position of relative ignorance about doctrine, procedure, and
practice. Moreover, he now usually cannot count on the prestige of a new
communication technology previously unheard of by jurist-informants.
Perhaps for this reason field studies of legal culture have turned
increasingly to venues far afield of formal legal institutions. “Law-like”
behavior became a stand-in for law, enabling fieldwork among a wider
variety of communities and contexts. As I am suggesting, this development
has been a mixed blessing. On one hand it has opened up the conceptual
field to consider the mutual influence of law and diffuse social behavior. On
the other hand, it may have diluted the influence of legal anthropology in the
mainstream legal academy. From the perspective of legally trained experts,
much law-like activity is a byproduct of formal legal activity. 92 The
formalities studied and practiced in the legal profession are, from that
position, non-negotiable. Or, as Halperin aptly writes, “[l]aw can bite and
often bites with a violence that is not purely symbolic”93
Clients often see lawyers as therapists, experts who at certain cost can
hear their problem and make it go away. But, to do this requires more than
hearing: it requires translation. And second, formalities are non-negotiable
because they are the ways in which client problems must be articulated in a
legally cognizable form for the adjudicator to resolve, or for opposing parties
91. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES 296 (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman
trans., 1992).
92. Civil recourse theorists, for instance, argue that one of tort law’s main functions is to provide a
formal right to redress with such right forming ones of the individual’s due process rights. John Goldberg,
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs,
115 YALE L.J. 524, 626 (2005).
93. Jean-Louis Halperin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64 ME. L.
REV. 45, 58 (2011); see also Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1364. Llewellyn also used the metaphor of
odontological violence:
The ‘legal’ has to do with ways and standards which will prevail in the pinch of challenge,
with rights and the acquisition of rights which have teeth, with liberties and powers whose
exercise can be made to stand up under attack. Let there be no doubt about this: you can
have law-stuff, undeniable law-stuff, which is neither right nor just; when you are put to the
choice, you will know the ‘legal’ from the right or just because the ‘legal,’ when insisted on,
is what prevails, and the right or just will have to suffer accordingly.
Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1364.
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to respond. The lawyer must take messy real world situations (“fact
patterns” in more didactic terms), break them into smaller, articulable units,
and then address them under rules and procedures already available.
Occasionally, as novel patterns arise, she has the opportunity to suggest new
ones.
Acculturation to this new modality of thought and communication has
vexed many a first-year law student. Elizabeth Mertz has incisively written
on language patterns in first-year courses at a wide variety of American law
schools. 94 There, she observed the ways in which new students are
encouraged to dissect cases in a distant and hyper-rational modality. 95
Students are rewarded for distant application of legal principles motivated by
well-settled policy, and discouraged from importation of affective and
subcultural instincts on the outcome of a case.96 For others, this abstraction
through pedagogy results in an overall professional distance that separates
law students from their lay context by the time of graduation.97 A better
understanding of law-like activity may shed light on this process in a few
ways.
First, law-like might be distinguished from law-in-action. The latter
begins with legal doctrine formalized at one or another level and requires
some fixed formal rule.98 Its goal is to observe that doctrine in practice. And
while it is true that the practice such doctrine may give rise to will differ
from that imagined by its architects, or vary from one context to another,
these are still occasioned and influenced by the norm itself. 99 Ethnographers

94. Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological
Translations, 34 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 93–94:
The distinctive epistemology that underlies legal language, as it is taught in the doctrinal
classrooms, fits very well with overall goals and features of the legal system in the United
States. Thus, there is a symbolic “fit” that connects teaching method, legal language, the
legal system, and that system’s underlying worldview. This symbolic connection makes
sense of the persistence of certain Socratic aspects of legal teaching, despite ongoing
complaints about efficacy, fairness to students of differing backgrounds, and negative
impacts on students. The cultural logic entailed by the fundamental worldview taught to
law students alters incipient lawyers’ orientations concerning human conflict, authority, and
morality. A crucial aspect of this changed orientation involves training students to read
texts with a new focus, so that they learn to interpret stories of conflict in legal terms. When
view through this lens, traditional legal pedagogy symbolically mirrors and reinforces an
epistemology that is vital to the legal system’s legitimacy.
Id.
95. Id. at 99.
96. Id. at 100.
97. Bix, supra note 5, at 983 (“Legal education is relevant to questions about the autonomy of law, not
only in the sense that this is the context in which forms of legal reasoning are passed on within the
profession, but also because the training itself may express the forms of knowledge and decision-making
that are considered distinctive for law, or at least for one particular legal system.”).
98. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., INTRODUCTION, LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER,
1 (2007).
99. See, e.g., GREENHOUSE II, supra note 41.
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have been remiss to conflate this with activity forming or negotiating
informal norms and their enforcement.100
To illustrate this, we might imagine a children’s playground game. That
game may incorporate rules formalized elsewhere—for instance in the
disciplinary handbook—such as “no hitting.” But a nexus between that form
and the playground rule would need to occur in order to properly call this
“law in action.” Such a nexus might be the moment of introduction when a
child introduces or invokes the formal school rules. Without this, the uptake
of social norm into informal practice is more properly “law-like”—it
illustrates the children’s mimesis of rulemaking and enforcement and not
necessarily law as such. Whether such behavior fulfills a need that is learned
or innate is a question beyond the scope of this article.
The playground illustrates a key distinction between law-like behavior
and law in action; formalized rules with enforceability. The informal
negotiation or negation of rules is ripe for ethnographic investigation and
tells us about identity, individualism, free will, belonging, community,
collectivism, opportunism, and so forth. But these topics are distinct from
the study of how discrete formal doctrines play out in real-world contexts.101
A presumption that this distinction is negligible, I contend, has limited the
reach of legal anthropology by ignoring the specific, integrated roles of
profession and expertise.
The will to look past such experts is, for reasons above, understandable.
But might the popular entrustment of advocacy to a legal profession—a
division of labor in some senses—be read ethnographically as expressing its
own wisdom? This question requires us to reflect on the nature of
“profession.” While sometimes compared to medicine, law’s status as a
profession is based on something other than erudition and clinical service.
The process of legal education serves, no doubt, as a rite of passage to
determine membership in the community of practice and expertise. But what
truly defines the “legal profession” is its ongoing self-governance or
autopoiesis. 102 Bar admission, adherence to the rules of professional
responsibility, and submission to judges formed by the same processes all
ensure that the law maintains practical and moral boundaries between itself
100. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 2 (“A basic difference can therefore be drawn between those laws
that have built into them a formal mechanism of enforcement[] that are supported by the possibility of
(ideally) behavior-modifying, judicially applied sanctions, and those that rely more exclusively on popular
opinion, compassion, the ‘politics of shame’, or . . . the cultivation of popular ‘indignation.’”).
101. A challenge to this may be found in juries. Some have pointed out the ambivalent view of juries in
modern tort law. The adherence to a common practice of general verdicts shields the jury from scrutiny
and prioritizes the common sense judgment of twelve jurors for the formal logic of common law rules.
KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 12 (3d ed. 2007); see also supra note 11
and accompanying text.
102. GUNTHER TEUBNER, AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (1987).
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and other fields through self-governance. This maintenance of an insular
community with discrete rules of practice and morality comes with a
language whose mastery is requisite to success. 103 Finding themselves
suddenly facing a dispute, lay individuals may either attempt to quickly learn
and deploy that language, or approach those trained or experienced in its
deployment. 104 For these reasons, the law world looks very different to
anthropologists and lawyers.
Thus, the tendency to see “law-like” conduct as “law” has missed a
significant opportunity. In an era when abrogation of rules and morality at
very high levels has been lightly scrutinized and poorly understood, what
should be anthropology’s role in bridging the disconnect between expert and
lay knowledge when that gap has permitted gross injustice on a global scale?
How can it study law in a way that takes seriously its “ethnographically”
experienced other-worldliness? 105 And above all here, how can it
communicate with experts in a way that takes seriously the way they do
business, the way laypeople see them, and the possibilities afforded by a
more relevant study of legal culture at its cores rather than just
peripheries?106

103. See GREENHOUSE II, supra note 43.
104. American popular culture is rife with examples of people doing this, much to the comedic pleasure
of wide audiences. LEGALLY BLONDE (MGM 2001) and MY COUSIN VINNY are but two cinematic
examples. These images also have a way of entering our lexicon as clichés, shorthand for the whole
uncanny experience of bridging an expertise gap from a precarious position despite all odds only to win.
See LEGALLY BLONDE (MGM 2001); MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992).
105. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 1. Niezen aptly terms this an “ethnography of the unknowable.” But
see, e.g., Tejani, supra note 58. This stands opposed to more accepted notions of “law as local
knowledge.”
106. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (2011). A breakdown of
the conceptual boundary between formal legal doctrine (even in action) and “law like” behavior has
coincided with the permeation of disciplinary boundaries. This has largely occurred in the form of
methodological and theoretical borrowing; the use of archives in ethnographic fieldworks is one key
example. See JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION
18 (1992). But this change has not razed disciplinary borders. If anything, it has brought discussions of
disciplinarity to the front of legal anthropological work. Such discussion can be important, as it serves a
goal of transparency and author positioning for scholarly audiences. Nevertheless, the trend toward this
interdisciplinary positioning comes with potential costs. Bringing law and anthropology together by
conceptual bridge-building surrenders the productive value of colliding the two at their conceptual cores.
The former enterprise has already been described above. It is represented in the argument that law can be
understood through “law like” behavior and entails an ethnographic focus on law’s margins. This allows
the researcher to approach a field site not otherwise of obvious ‘value’ to mainstream lawyers and
describe ways in which it is analogous to the situations in which they more often operate. This then
allows them to draw lessons for their own work. Whether lawyers complete this process is questionable.
More likely, they stop short because other disciplines and their studies are more direct about their
message.
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1. Disciplinary Power
A preliminary step might be to reevaluate the conceptual weight given to
disciplinary power in legal ethnography. That term, distinguished from State
or sovereign power as the exercise of domination in micro-social
relationships, originated by French social philosopher Michel Foucault and
has pervaded social science and humanities in Europe and North America
over the past twenty years.107 Disciplinary power is pessimistic about human
nature: heavily influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault saw discipline rooted in
the human being’s individual will to dominate its local contexts while
serving the legitimation of sovereign power.108 Historical examples of this
abounded in his time. French collaboration under Vichy, Colonial repression
in North Africa, and quotidian military atrocities in South East Asia, were all
recent or contemporaneous political concerns for the French Nietzscheans.
In a sense disciplinary power evokes the law jobs. The law jobs are
diffuse law and law-like activities in which wide numbers of tribal members
participate, and upon which the successful governance of Cherokee behavior
and social reproduction is premised.109 They represent a kind of legitimacy or
“buy-in” where tribal members collaborated in their own normative
regulation. Similarly, disciplinary power and its myriad practical sites serve
the legitimacy of sovereign power—the basis for State authority. Beyond
107. Most Cited Authors of Books in the Humanities, 2007, Times Higher Education (FEB. 10, 2013),
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=405956.
108. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977 98 (1980) (“Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which
only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like
organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target;
they are always also the elements of its articulation.”); see also id. at 105 (“This new type of power, which
can no longer be formulated in terms of sovereignty, is, I believe, one of the great inventions of bourgeois
society. It has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of
society that is its accompaniment. This non-sovereign power, which lies outside the form of sovereignty,
is disciplinary power. Impossible to describe in the terminology of the theory of sovereignty from which
it differs so radically, this disciplinary power ought by rights to have led to the disappearance of the grand
juridical edifice created by that theory. But in reality, the theory of sovereignty has continued not only to
exist as an ideology of right, but also to provide the organising principle of the legal codes of Europe
acquired in the nineteenth century, beginning with the Napoleonic Code . . . . [T]he theory of sovereignty,
and the organisation of a legal code centred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed
upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of
domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the
State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights. The juridical systems—and this applies both to their
codification and to their theorisation—have enabled sovereignty to be democratised through the
constitution of a public right articulated upon collective sovereignty, while at the same time this
democratisation of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of
disciplinary coercion.” ) (emphasis added).
109. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1373.
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legitimacy, the two concepts both capture a demand for efficiency supplied
by legal culture. If we take as axiomatic law’s goal of regulating human
behavior (optimal deterrence in some iterations of tort law) then we must
account for its ability to accomplish this in the lives of the many while only
directly acting upon relatively few individuals.110 This efficiency requisite
for law’s success is accomplished precisely through the functioning of “legal
culture.” Both law jobs and disciplinary power seem to account for this
demand and supply of legal culture.
But morally the two concepts are sharply different. Llewellyn and
Hoebel described the Cherokee approach to law and legal institutions in
order to shed light on the American context around them. Llewellyn used
the Cherokee example to support legal realism—the philosophy that law is
geared to the solution of real problems through pragmatic jurisprudence
rather than through rote application of rules to facts.111 In this sense, the law
jobs provided an opportunity to assert that, in its purest contexts (e.g., tribal
society), law was a pragmatic and aspirational endeavor and as such
incorporated the practices of a larger swath of the society.112
In medical anthropology, disciplinary power has inspired ethnographic
and theoretical writings that bridge the physiological and psychological lives
of people with the quotidian exercise of State power.113 There, discipline is
used to question citizen complicity with the State’s exercise of sovereign
power. The sovereignty of States cannot function, Foucault wrote, but for
the everyday, quotidian acts of discipline wherein human beings effectively
police one another’s behavior and enforce norms. 114 These sites of
disciplinary power have been highly attractive to legal anthropology: NGOs
conducting human rights work in the developing world, immigration clinics
in metropolitan borderlands, or property conceptions among artists or
computer programmers. Studies at these and other sites show us how norms
become assimilated and enforced by people in the day to day, and thus how
law achieves its greatest efficiency through the ability to control behavior
without having to act upon all those within its purview. This is particularly
true in new cultural contexts where State authority has not yet been
formalized.115
And yet are valuable ethnographic studies of these intriguing sites the
study of law and its material or are they, rather, studies of the influence of
110. See, e.g., NIEZEN, supra note 18.
111. Ajay Mehrotra, Law and the “Other”: Karl N. Llewellyn, Cultural Anthropology, and the Legacy
of the Cheyenne Way, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 741, 743 (2001).
112. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1373.
113. See, e.g., JOAO BIEHL, VITA: LIFE IN A ZONE OF SOCIAL ABANDONMENT (2005); see also NANCY
SCHEPER-HUGHES, DEATH WITHOUT WEEPING: THE VIOLENCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN BRAZIL (1992).
114. NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 16.
115. The early Internet is a prime example of this pre-formalized normative environment. See, e.g.,
Gabriella Coleman, The Political Agnosticism of Free and Open Source Software and the Inadvertent
Politics of Contrast, 77 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 03 (2004).
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law at informal or pre-formalized sites and their material? For instance,
while Geertz writes, “[l]aw doesn’t just mop up, it defines[,]”116 the dualistic
role of law in mopping up and world making is no longer denied in legal
scholarship and profession. But, the “world making” role of law in all
societies, has at times been cleverly held at bay because its lessons do not
facilitate solution of specific problems in specifically enforceable ways.
Law, then, does not just mop up—but it does do that among other things
when applied to messy social or interpersonal situations. If so, this is simply
because we say it can.
This “provisionality” of clean-up and its legitimation of power
arrangements seems to be the focus of much legal anthropology. My
contention is that neither provisionality nor legitimation should be news to
legal philosophers. Of greater insight—both to scholars of law and the
‘publics’ impacted by their students—are the means by which the materiality
of law, its rules, procedures, and institutions, escape the gaze of legal
subjects through occultation. 117 One such means, I suggest below, is the
legal black boxing of culture in the very language of common law rules.
2. Law as Culture
With its embrace of disciplinary power, legal anthropology saw
diminished influence upon legal education and jurisprudence; this
estrangement vexed a discipline once thought to be the most “activist” of the
social sciences.118 Cognizant of this malaise, recent works have called for a
reappraisal of the use-value of anthropology to law, and an “invitation” of
lawyers to embrace the cultural foundations of their discipline and
profession.119 In furtherance of this, Rosen suggests lawyers should view
law, not simply in relation to, but as culture.120
Echoing Geertz, Rosen writes that law consists of the formal and
practical creation and negotiation of categories. 121 When this becomes
difficult, arguments are made about why new sets of facts belong in one or
another category, or why existing categories must be stretched to

116. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 8.
117. Tejani, supra note 58.
118. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 200.
119. Id.; see GREENHOUSE I, supra note 17.
120. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 200.
121. Id. This insight is almost as old as anthropology. “Anthropologists have long been aware of a
basic human capacity to construct categories that bring together patterns of belonging and behavior. In
The Savage Mind, Claude Lévi-Strauss draws upon a wide range of nineteenth-century ethnological
material . . . to illustrate social-conceptual categories connected to emblematic forms of behavior . . . .”
NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 15.
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accommodate new factual variations. 122 Not unlike the lurking structural
anthropology of Levi-Strauss, Rosen’s account enables analogy of law to the
very workings of cognition through language. These, we are told, filter the
mind’s eye as it gazes out upon the world.123
But the characterization of law as culture contains a premise I wish to
problematize here. This is the notion that law and culture act with the same,
or similar, relative torque upon what human beings take for granted as
“Real.” Reality, the proposition goes, is socially constructed. 124 Its
construction consists of fundamental building blocks of perception and
understanding: categories by some accounts, words and symbols by others.
Use of these categories, words, or symbols, is everything. Created and
exchanged among individuals, these become not only the common
denominator of community, but, as learned in Geertz’ account, requisite to
belonging in it.125 Thus, one’s status in a community is not only dependent
upon internal point-to-point relationships, but also upon one’s relationship to
the “Reality” in which that community lives and operates.
V. LEGAL “BLACK BOXES”: TORT LAW AND THE PROVISIONAL AUTONOMY
OF CULTURE
The common law is self-reflexive of its role in reproducing social
stability through cultural integration. In it, Anglo-American jurists have
constructed doctrinal regions where cultural questions are cordoned off to be
decided ad hoc as questions of “fact” in discrete cases and contexts. 126
Borrowing from Bruno Latour’s seminal work in science and technology
studies, I wish to consider these doctrinal zones legal black boxes.127 For
Latour, “black boxing” entailed the deferral of questions about a given
system unit’s function when the objective was to understand the system as a

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Social constructivism has modern origins in the sociology of Emile Durkheim characterized postmodern social science and reached an apogee with social studies of virtual reality. See EMILE DURKHEIM,
THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1895); PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); SHERRY TURKLE,
LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
125. Supra note 77.
126. I specify “Anglo-american” here because it remains to be conjectured whether this development is
so ubiquitous in other contexts. It may well be; however, I suspect that its emergence is related to the
development of modern nations and nationalisms that sought legitimacy by transcending cultural
particularisms of the previous age. In forthcoming work, I will explore the relationship of legal black
boxing of culture to the rise of modern nation-states.
127. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH
SOCIETY (1987). Myriad spaces in the formal law are carved out and protected to permit judges and juries
to defer certain questions to the realms of community, nation, industry—all of which are placeholders for
culture. While this does not hermetically seal law from culture, it does practically separate the two in
ways highly consequential to both practitioners and clients.
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whole. 128 While on one hand such designated zones illustrate the wide
imbrication of law and culture (e.g. all law is immanently language), they
also indicate a self-conscious effort to separate cultural concerns from legal
ones for the purpose of structuring decision-making, advocacy, and public
behavior. These areas attest to law’s provisional autonomy, and the
perennial effort that must go into maintaining this. In this way, legal black
boxes are the site at which law fabricates its own autonomy and where
knowledge of such fabrication is occulted–hidden behind expert knowledge
and practice.
The law of torts illustrates this process well.129 There, common law rules
have been developed, enshrined in judicial opinions, and codified into the
various Restatements on Law by the American Law Institute. Examining
discrete causes of action in torts and their constituent “elements,” one sees in
them a pattern of deferring cultural questions to non-legal authority (e.g. jury
or judge as fact-finder). In the law of torts, cultural questions become
variables in the analysis permitted by the rule, but values ascribed to those
variables are left provisional. This treatment permits law to serve its overtly
normative function while separating description from norm.
A. Description and Norm
The dichotomy between description and norm has preoccupied both law
and legal anthropology.130 With interpretive anthropology came a realization
that divisions between description and norm—fact and law for Geertz—were
culturally relative.131 Later, the writing process itself came to be considered
a descriptive endeavor as no researcher was an unfiltered lens through which
culture was simply magnified.132 This focus upon description was welcomed
after early ethnographic work had been used in the ordering and regulation of
native peoples by colonial regimes. 133 Whereas description had once been
128. Id.
129. Bix, supra note 5, at 985 (“The argument of the neo-formalists is that certain areas of doctrine
(e.g. tort law) have an essence, which current practices roughly express, but the law should be reformed to
express that essence more fully.”) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Riles, supra note 23, at 643–44. Some have cogently sought to establish the contingency
of this dichotomy across cultural contexts. One early illustration might be the more functionalist accounts
of Malinowski where focus upon proximate documentation of norms distinguished itself from the
distanced generalizing process of armchair ethnology. In those days, tribal communities were approached
as human laboratories and the field researcher viewed himself as scientist. He saw his work of
documenting native practices, beliefs, and symbolism not as description but as inscription—writing in text
what he observed in front of him. Riles, supra note 23, at 603–04.
131. Geertz II, supra note 68.
132. JAMES CLIFFORD & GEORGE MARCUS, WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF
ETHNOGRAPHY (1986).
133. Id. at 9–10.
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viewed as objective observation of people in their context, it was now one
researcher’s experience with a circumscribed group that may or may not have
been generalizable to the entire society. 134
This disclaimer makes anthropology conceptually more interesting and
presents a safe space for the reflexive description of disappearing cultures, or
metropolitan subcultures. It serves an archival function, still ripe since the
time of Lévi-Strauss, 135 but it also serves the comparativist priority by
providing so-called raw material for comparison across cultural boundaries,
and thus, the mapping of those boundaries themselves.
Despite these virtues of avoiding normative argument, legal
anthropology might reevaluate potential for its own normative judgments
about change in ethnographic communities (particularly as those get closer to
home), and the possibility that lawmakers in their informants’ communities
will take up ethnographic accounts in regulating local behavior.136 Many will
cringe at this: first, because ethnographers prefer not to consider their
accounts as “empirical output,” and second because such accounts have
generally and purposely removed themselves from temporality. While law
embraces its temporal position through arguments about change, legal
anthropology has long distanced itself from time through snapshots of legal
culture in the perennial “ethnographic present.”137 This reservation misses
two key things. First, as others have said, descriptive accounts are built upon
frameworks of normative thinking.138 Second, normative arguments, even if
provisionally autonomous, make descriptive suppositions about the “way the
world works.”139
The mutuality of description and norm in law is nearly inverse to that in
anthropology. Whereas in anthropology normative considerations lurk deep
in the background of even reflexive projects, in law, descriptive propositions
remain obscured. 140 Proponents of a renewed role for legal anthropology
have long noted the myriad background cultural assumptions underpinning
legal arguments and decisions.141 Those discussions do not reflect heavily on
134. Id. at 10 (“Cultures do not hold still for their portraits. Attemtps to make them do so always
involve simplification and exclusion, selection of a temporal focus, the construction of a particular selfother relationship, and the imposition or negotiation of a power relationship.”).
135. Lévi-Strauss, supra note 66.
136. ASAD, supra note 65.
137. E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE STUDY OF MAN 32 (1972) (“Cultures are constantly
changing and modifying. Yet in anthropology we investigate a society on a field trip of greater or less
duration, after which we write up a monograph describing its culture. In so doing, we fix for the moment
those main lines of characteristic behavior that have been perceived and noted as though they were all
taking place at any given moment.”).
138. Riles, supra note 23, at 644.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 5, at 762 (“[Langdell] said that the principles oflaw could be inferred from judicial
opinions, so that the relevant training for students of the law was in reading and comparing opinions and
the relevant knowledge was the knowledge of what those opinions contained.”).
141. See ROSEN, supra note 23; see also DAVID ENGLE & MICHAEL MCCANN, FAULT LINES: TORT
LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 1–20 (2009).
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questions of how the world works and rather serve to forestall any such
reflection. When legal anthropology presents the problem of cultural
assumptions in law then, it usually does so with two implicit messages: first,
that realization of this brings added value to lawyers, and second, that
capacity to deliver such value grants the subfield its best entry into academic
law.
These two notions, I am suggesting, may be overly optimistic.
Awareness of the cultural assumptions that enter core legal discussions does
not necessarily add value to the work of lawyers because it is insight with
which they are already familiar. That is to say, the very work of lawyers—
both their reason for being and their formal and informal training—is meant
to set aside cultural reflection. This has been observed at several sites:
Mertz’ study of the law school environment is one example, while Rosen’s
discussion of the oracular quality of civil juries is another. 142 Engel and
McCann, meanwhile, have noted the great latitude afforded judges on
deciding cultural questions as a “matter of law” in several areas of tort law.143
B. Tort Law’s Little Black Boxes
To better understand such deference, it is necessary to consider how
formal law treats its contextual cultural environment. This consideration is
interested not in the way law ramifies in its social context, but in the way
social context is processed in legal concepts. For this purpose I propose a
brief but closer reading of Anglo-American tort law. There, legal doctrine is
not a panacea for understanding law’s occultation, but it is one example
where ethnographic and ethnological study of law benefits from observation
of the sovereign power behind it. In this case, black boxes in tort law
illustrate how the sovereign authority of institutional rules attempts to
prescribe the relationship they shall have with their cultural environment.
1. Strict Liability
The law of torts may be divided into two basic regimes–strict liability
and fault liability—imposed through specific causes of action developed
142. See Mertz, supra note 100; ROSEN, supra note 23, at 147; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at
6–7 (“There are two different kinds of fact-finding that juries perform. One is making ‘pure’ findings of
fact. This requires answering empirical questions about the world, past, present, or future: did the
defendant strike the plaintiff, how long had the banana peel been lying on the supermarket aisle before the
plaintiff slipped on it . . . . I do not mean to minimize how difficult it sometimes is to answer merely
empirical questions. Predicting how much an injured person will suffer from her injury twenty years from
now is a pure empirical question, but that does not make it any easier to answer.”).
143. ENGEL & MCCANN, supra note 141.
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under common law. Within each of these, deference on matters of culture
appears across the entire spectrum of liability theories.
To begin, strict liability was created, and then expanded to cover few
very specific kinds of harm resulting from activity that in essence is
considered “abnormally dangerous.” 144 This concept has changed in its
accounting for change over time, and its legitimacy and efficiency are
premised not only on corrective justice and deterrence but on changes in
these values as societies evolve. Hence, the First Restatement imposes strict
liability for “ultrahazardous activity,” defining it in terms of the risk of
serious harm “not eliminated by exercise of utmost care” and by the lack of
commonality of the conduct. 145 This definition allowed that even highly
dangerous activity could become more or less common in time and place.146
In the Second Restatement, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) switched to
labelling this conduct “abnormally dangerous” and added a list of six factors
in applying the standard.147 Most significant was inclusion of factors of
appropriateness to place and social utility.148 The addition of these factors
illustrates the derivative operation of strict liability law vis-à-vis culture;
factors adjusting for cultural change in the law would themselves change
subject to new priorities. In this case, both utility and place index an added
emphasis on the particular industrial use of land and conduct in question and
their value to the ambient society.149 It is important to note that such rules of
contextual valuation support cultural mythologies that underpin governance
more generally. For example, they have often celebrated environmental
purity as a requisite for domestic family life.150
Finally, the Third Restatement dropped the six factor test and returned to
the earlier, simplified rule reinstating “abnormally dangerous” and defining it
in terms of foreseeability, risk despite reasonable care, and commonality of
the conduct. 151 Remaining behind this rule today is a flexibility toward
cultural shifts in conduct, and the background assumption that greater

144. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law’s Conscience, in TORTS STORIES 207
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
145. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
146. Context would already be taken for granted as English speaking and subject to Common Law “rule
of law.”
147. Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D. Va. 1991); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j–h (1977).
149. See id.
150. Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969) (“The fifth and perhaps most crucial factor
under the Institute’s guidelines as applied to this case is the appropriateness of the activity in the particular
place where it is being carried on. No one would deny that gasoline stations as a rule do not present any
particular danger to the community. However, when the operation of such activity involves the placing of
a large tank adjacent to a well from which a family must draw its water for drinking, bathing and laundry,
at least that aspect of the activity is inappropriate to the locale, even when equated to the value of the
activity.”)
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010).
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incidence of that conduct may serve to limit liability for harm it creates.152
The goal here, like most of tort law, is not to compensate for all wrongs
created, but to compensate for wrongs which represent a departure from
accepted cultural practices.153 Those practices are themselves not specified;
and yet, the rules of strict liability have been rearticulated by the ALI with
greater frequency—and seemingly greater urgency—than most other areas of
tort law.154 Likely, the gravity of liability without fault in a social context
that prides (or defines) itself on due process necessitates greater fealty toward
community values out of which law is said to derive. Here, overt deference
to culture prevails especially when the potential for substantive injustice
through liability without fault is great. In such cases, one might say, the law
“punts” to culture.
In difficult cases, these cultural questions are tried to a jury. Civil juries
are permitted to address questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact
only after a long arduous process of pre-trial and trial advocacy.155 By the
time a question, or questions, reach the jury, one or both sides has failed to
prevail on motions to dismiss, summary judgment, or directed verdicts. 156
The judge cannot, “as a matter of law,” say that certain conduct was, for
instance, “unreasonable” or departed from “professional standards.” At this,
its highest level of difficulty, the law defers to a jury of twelve picked “at
random” for putative cross-sectional representativity of local culture.157 The
jury, in its culturally monadic function, operates in Rosen’s words as an
“oracle” to which the society turns for almost mystical guidance on a
difficult question.158
2. Fault Liability
Beyond narrow strict liability rules, tort law recognizes fault liability for
wrongs committed both intentionally and negligently.
Considering
intentional torts alone, one might expect to find little room internally for
cultural questions and, as a result, little need to defer those questions beyond
152. See id. § 20, cmt. j (2010).
153. ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 19 (“At best, the desirability of providing compensation will be a
factor that, when linked with others, makes it more likely that there will be tort liability for a particular
category of conduct. And even on that view, providing compensation under certain circumstances rather
than in general is what is really going on when tort liability is imposed.”).
154. See generally supra notes 145, 147, and 151. Each of the three Restatement of Torts offers a
different definition of actvitities so dangerous they are subject to strict liability.
155. ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 5.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Catherine Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justificiation for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2386–87 (1990).
158. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 83–84, 147–48.
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doctrinal articulation. After all, to consider whether someone was wronged
intentionally is, at first blush, a simple inquiry into the nexus between act,
intent, and result. The first and third of these components are questions of
cause and effect; the second is a question of mental state that often poses no
significant factual question because it is read in terms of external
manifestation of intent to act rather than intent to harm.159 And indeed, for
harms to the person in “single-intent” jurisdictions the actor need only have
intended physical contact making the intent analysis very simple and
rendering a claim such as battery nearly a strict liability type concern.160
a. Intentional Harms
But, as torts scholars point out, the question of intent has long been an
enigma for jurists.161 An actor’s thoughts can never be known with certainty,
and this becomes even more true in diachronic perspective. Some explain
that intent is at best a subjective question based on objective evidence: what
was this person more likely than not thinking given the appearance of the
evidence to “average reasonable people.”162 Then, again, the appearance of
evidence to the average reasonable person becomes a question for the jury if
the judge believes that reasonable minds could differ on the topic. At this
stage, the question is black boxed with the wisdom of lay culture deferred to
in the resulting answer.
Other than “objective” indicia of intent in the harms to the person, the
law defers to the “oracular” role of culture when protecting other more
ephemeral rights. In particular, nuisance, reputational and dignitary harms,
and invasions of privacy all have built into their doctrines discrete black
boxes where final disposition can rely heavily on local cultural questions. In
nuisance law, such deference is identifiable in the requirements of
significance and unreasonableness in the invasion of another’s use and
enjoyment of land.163 Under Restatement §821F nuisance allows liability “. .
. only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be
suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal
condition and used for a normal purpose.”164 Under §822, “One is subject to
liability for a private nuisance if . . . his conduct is a legal cause of an
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and
the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable.
159. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 403 (1891).
160. Joseph H. King, The Tort’s Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent For Battery, and
Reflections on the Province of Restatements, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 623, 626 (2011).
161. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 2, 23–26; see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 24 (2000).
162. See ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 23–26
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979).
164. Id. § 822.

2013

LITTLE BLACK BOXES

163

“Unreasonable” in this rule has come to be analyzed using a multi-factor
balancing test that weighs gravity of the harm against utility of the
conduct.165 While arguably any balancing test opens up analysis to increased
case-by-case discretion and non-doctrinal reasoning, this one is particularly
designed to defer assessment of nuisance to local culture. Public policy
justification for this move is strong: in conflicts over land use “place” matters
and local custom over time is the best marker of that.166 Hard, fast rules on
reasonable use designed by remote judges would burden the kind of
dynamism English and American capitalist economies traditionally needed to
support constant growth. Not unlike the flexibility built into strict liability
law over time, nuisance exhibits the same change-friendly derivative 167
qualities through judicious deferral to cultural considerations rooted in
“place.”
Integration of cultural black boxes in dignitary and reputational harms is
nearly too obvious to mention and has been alluded to more frequently. In
the case of defamation, this is most apparent in the analysis of “defamatory
matter.” 168 There the plaintiff must show that the language used in a
statement would have a tendency to harm her reputation among a significant
and respectable minority of the community.169 A minority rule limits this
“community” definition to “right thinking people.” 170 Lyrissa Lidsky has
argued that these definitions afford significant flexibility to judges both for
arriving at a final outcome on defamation, as well as the subsidiary question
of which “subcultures” will be legitimized in the eyes of the law.171
Defamatory matter illustrates a fascinating quality of jurisprudence—
particularly in relation to the work of anthropology. It raises the question of
whether law at this site is, or should be, concerned with normative values or

165. Id. § 826.
166. See, e.g., Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 1–48 (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga eds., 2003).
167. I use derivative in its mathematical sense accounting for changes in change over time.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is defamatory if it tends so to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him.”).
169. Id.; see also Lyrissa Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“[C]ourts rarely resort to polls, surveys or even witness testimony to determine the
values held by the community segment but instead rely on their own personal knowledge and common
sense.”).
170. See, e.g., Loder v. Nied, 89 A.D.3d 1197, 1198–99 (explaining that a statement is defamatory if it
“tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion
of him [or her] in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him [or her] of their friendly
intercourse in society”).
171. See Lidsky, supra note 169, at 8 (“The intuitive nature of this inquiry raises the question of whether
and to what extent courts should consider sub community values . . . .”).
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description. 172 If the answer is description, then this demands we use
community values embedded in the “defamatory matter” analysis to
faithfully capture the way local cultures classify people as good and bad. If
we believe law should behave normatively in this context, the analysis allows
judges to shape community values by sanctioning local views they determine
to be socially valid. In practice, the latter occurs either through the minority
rule of “right thinking persons” or through the majority rule’s selectivity in
recognizing groups that are “substantial” or “respectable.”173
Finally, invasion of privacy torts are identifiably similar in at least one
respect: their rules—in most jurisdictions, four separate actions all directed at
the protection of individual right to solitude or control over image—have
within them a conspicuous objective element that measures individual harm
against community norms. Thus, intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure,
and false light all require that the harmful invasion must be “highly
offensive” to the average reasonable person.174 This is a critical element of
the privacy theories because, in addition to the subjective experience of such
invasions, the plaintiff must show an objective wrong—that most others in
his community would be not only disturbed, but “highly” disturbed by the
conduct.175 This aspect of the rule requires a trial judge to first consider
whether reasonable jurors could disagree on this question, and then the jurors
themselves to reflect upon the degree of offense in a way inscrutable to the
legal process that has led to that point.176
Between nuisance, defamation, and invasions of privacy, analysis for
liability centers upon the classification of conduct as harmful. Through the
concepts of “substantial and unreasonable,” “defamatory matter,” and
“highly offensive,” that classification often becomes a cultural consideration
inscribed into, and enshrined in, formal rules.
b. Negligent Harms
Finally, in negligence, tort law is interested neither in the determination
of intent, nor in the classification of intentional conduct as harmful, but in the
determination of breach—nonconformity with a standard of care. 177
Standard of care in these instances is defined by one of only a few principles,
172. See id. at 9 (showing that this clearly accesses the normative-descriptive tension common to Tort
Law, “the underlying question is whether the defamatoriness inquiry should focus on actual community
values and prejudices or whether, as it currently does, the inquiry should impose normative restrictions on
what values it will recognize”).
173. Id. at 9, 21; see also DOBBS, supra note 161, at 1127–28.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D(a), 652E (1977).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B cmt. d, 652D cmt. c, 652E cmt. c. (1977)
176. See, e.g., Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 298, 303 (D. Del. 1999) (“. . . a
determination of whether a particular intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ is often left to
the consideration of a jury . . .”).
177. See ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 51.
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each of which requires the positioning of the actor in his or her
“community.”178 For most cases, this is the fictional community of average
“reasonable men,” and the law places final determination on this in the hands
of jurors whose reasoning is typically be shielded from review.179 In others it
may be an industrial or professional peer group. In some instances, this may
involve twelve lay persons deciding highly technical issues such as whether
medical or engineering standards were followed. Deference to lay wisdom in
the form of negligence law’s reliance upon the “reasonable person” is simply
a final example here of the cultural black boxes constructed under tort law.
Through strict liability, and intentional and negligent theories of fault
liability, black boxes maintain deference to cultural questions in a very
precise, compartmentalized fashion. They ensure not that the law will have a
normative grip on ambient society, but that difficult questions the law cannot
resolve will be punted back to the more dynamic and derivatively functional
realm of culture. As I am suggesting, even when decided by judges, these
questions are rhetorically differentiated in a manner that reflects law’s
deliberate management of its own autonomy. While these observations alone
offer some insight, the key question is how legal anthropology should
approach and incorporate them given the relatively wide gulf between the
disciplines.
VI. PATHWAYS TO RAPPORT
Law’s deference to culture at the very heart of its rule statements—
evident at least at the site of Anglo-American tort law—is self-reflexive. This
is because, as suggested above, law too far removed from local culture lacks
the capacity to change with change, that culture so ingeniously possesses.
The little black boxes apparent in the examples above are not accidents
inscribed into doctrine in need of further explanation; they are sites at which
law has deliberately deferred to the wisdom of the “laity” and asked not for

178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965). The relevant portion states:
The chief advantage of this standard of the reasonable man is that it enables the triers of fact
who are to decide whether the actor’s conduct is such as to subject him to liability for
negligence, to look to a community standard rather than an individual one, and at the same
time to express their judgment of what that standard is in terms of the conduct of a human
being. The standard provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway, to permit due allowance to
be made for such differences between individuals as the law permits to be taken into
account, and for all of the particular circumstances of the case which may reasonably affect
the conduct required, and at the same time affords a formula by which, so far as possible, a
uniform standard may be maintained.
Id.
179. Gender bias in this codified formulation is a rich topic best left to another discussion.
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an explanation of that wisdom. 180 Viewed in this light, the predominant
explanatory offering of legal anthropology to academic law—be it reparatory
or critical—is often moot. Or, it might be said, it fulfills a demand where
one may not exist.
It is not simply that formal Western law recognizes in ways described
above the improvised wisdom of everyday life and limitations of its
formalism. It is that the law, its practitioners, teachers, philosophers, and
authors, all exert considerable albeit unspoken effort to separate the cultural
considerations from the formal rules. This effort represents perhaps the
greatest expenditure of human capital in legal education. Law’s purpose, in
short, is not to explain reality but to shape it—hence increasing reliance upon
the neighboring disciplines.181 Given this, legal anthropological appeals for
greater attention and impact in law must be very specific about the
explanatory offerings they present and be cognizant of the precise points of
contact between law and culture prescribed by the former through its
ultimately sovereign authority. Assuming the desirability of a legal
anthropology influential upon law, a well-tailored message is now more
necessary than ever.
That message, I am suggesting, ought not to take the form of “law as
culture.” Legal anthropology may be interested in law ‘wherever it lies,’ and
law may be ‘practiced’ by a wide variety of actors, but these do not make law
synonymous with, or a subset of, culture. Continuing to assert otherwise
does not interpellate a greater law audience, and understanding this requires
understanding law’s reason for existence and the specific tactics of its
practitioners. Reluctance toward this understanding in anthropology has
been surprising given the usual preference for insider perspectives in most
other corners of the discipline.
Such difficulty stems from the duality of law as both a discipline (or
epistemic community) and a profession (or practice). 182 In arguing for a
greater rapport of legal anthropology through the surrendering of a “law as
culture” approach, this article has largely ignored this duality, and a proper
distinction between them is better left to another discussion. Anthropology
180. “Social host” rules are a good example of this. In Kelly v. Gwinnell, the New Jersey Supreme
Court wrote:
This [c]ourt senses that there may be a substantial change occurring in social attitudes and
customs concerning drinking, whether at home or in taverns. We believe that this change
may be taking place right now in New Jersey and perhaps elsewhere. It is the upheaval of
prior norms by a society that has finally recognized that it must change its habits and do
whatever is required, whether it means but a small change or a significant one, in order to
stop the senseless loss inflicted by drunken drivers. We did not cause that movement, but
we believe this decision is in step with it.
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1229 (N.J. 1984).
181. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 771 (“[N]othing in a conventional legal education—nothing
gleaned from a close reading of judicial opinions, statutes and rules—equips a person to notice, let alone
to measure, explain, temper, and adjust to, and increase in the demand for judicial services.”).
182. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 10.
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too is both an epistemology and practice; it is based on a belief that
experience is the most faithful source of knowledge and that fieldwork is
most efficient in attaining this in geographically remote situations. 183
However, in both epistemology and in practice, the priorities of goaloriented, formal reasoning make ongoing use of the little black boxes in legal
doctrine described above. To make a relevant and utile explanatory offering
to law in both of these contexts, legal anthropology might attend to—even if
only with provisional fealty toward the insider approach—the rigorous
formalism that characterizes Western law and neutralizes the benefit of “law
as culture.”184
To achieve this, several ruptures are necessary. First, the subfield might
further break from its “primitivist” past to develop new tools for
understanding the complexity of law in the current world system. Up to this
point few efforts have managed to disaggregate the anthropological object
known as “law.” Classic legal anthropology continues to influence present
day conversations and studies aimed to understand Western legal concepts
and processes largely by studying non-Western norms and dispute resolution
systems. 185 Those works tended to suppose the “primitivism” of nonWestern native systems and described them from the outside first through
armchair ethnology and later through ethnographic fieldwork. 186 As the
183. See JAMES DONOVAN, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION, XIII (2008) (“The sea change
represented by Malinowski for anthropology generally not only legal anthropology was his long fieldwork
among the Trobriand Islanders, conducted in the native language, for primarily scientific purposes. The
systematic and meticulous record of his research was qualitatively superior to the travel logs and
missionary reports that to that point had provided most of the information available to theorists working
from their overstuffed armchairs . . . .”).
184. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 12–13:
Some critics will be anxious to say at this point that our project is not only partial in these
various ways but wrong, that we will misunderstand legal process if we pay special attention
to lawyers' doctrinal arguments about what the law is. They say these arguments obscure—
perhaps they aim to obscure—the important social function of law as ideological
phenomenon demands, these critics say, a more scientific or sociological or historical
approach that pays no or little attention to jurisprudential puzzles over the correct
characterization of legal argument . . . . This objection fails by its own standards. It asks for
social realism, but the kind of theory it recommends is unable to provide it. Of course law is
a social phenomenon. But, its complexity, function, and consequence all depend on one
special feature of its structure. Legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena, is
argumentative . . . . This crucial argumentative aspect of legal practice can be studied in
two ways or from two points of view. One is the external point of view of the sociologist or
historian, who asks why certain patterns of legal argument develop in some periods or
circumstances rather than in others, for example. The other is the internal point of view of
those who make the laims...they want theoeries not about how history and economics have
shaped their consciousnessbut about the place of these disciplines in argument about what
the law requires them to do or have . . . . Both perspectives on law, the external and the
internal, are essential, and each must embrace or take account of the other.
185. See supra note 32.
186. See Hoebel, supra note 32, at 62, 66 (describing generally the evolutionism in Morgan, Maine and
others).
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interpretivist approach came to dominate ethnography, it took the insider
perspective on norms and dispute resolution defining this in terms of legal
subjects generally—not only law makers and law enforcers.187 This approach
seemed suitable in the tribal societies of North Africa, Indonesia, or the
South Pacific, where members of legal communities participate in the
operation and structure of their own governing systems. In short, law could
best be understood from the native’s point of view in studies where its
arbiters (elders, tribal councils, shamans) are its subjects (villagers,
tribesmen) and imperialism in its various forms is considered—if at all—an
externality.188
A similar approach has been transposed onto studies of Western, modern
law through the advent of disciplinary power as a conceptual tool.189 This
tool has maintained dominance because it opens up the social study of law to
increasingly obscure, subtle, and sometimes ingenious sites of fieldwork or
historiography. 190 Nevertheless, as I am suggesting, the predominance of
disciplinary power in legal anthropology has attenuated the voice of the
subfield for at least two basic reasons. First, the persistence of legal
anthropology’s genealogy in “primitive law” may hinder creativity in
approaching modern day, complex legal systems. Despite the relative
eclecticism of the subfield and its studies, the one feature common to most
legal anthropologies becomes their emergence from the history of legal
anthropology. The tautology of this characterization suggests stagnation in a
field trained upon a fast changing and highly complex area of the social
world. This entails acknowledging the autonomy of formal law in the West
in a way that distinguishes it considerably from earlier norms and dispute
resolutions observed in early legal anthropology. Second, this genealogy
retains influence even as the studies of which it consists have been
discredited, the societies it described since re-characterized, and those same
societies transformed by economic globalization. In short, “primitive” law
no longer exists, if ever it did. The failure to account for and describe that
which replaces it in the world system has been a hindrance to the relevance
of legal anthropology in academic law.

187. See, e.g., Geertz, supra note 68, at 182.
188. See, e.g., Vincent Pecora, The Limits of Local Knowledge, in THE NEW HISTORICISM 259 (H. Aram
Veeser ed.) (1989) (“Geertz’s professed belief in a ‘civil, temperate, unheroic, politics’ would be
unexceptionable , were it not prone at the same time to narrativize such qualities through the maturing of
‘naïve’ nations-in-transition into Western-style parliamentary democracies; because of his desire to
penetrate, like Max Weber, what the social actors ‘thought they were up to,’ the fact that pro-Western
‘civil’ and ‘temperate’ politics could be imposed from ‘outside’ is never really considered to be a
possibility.”).
189. FOUCAULT, supra note 108.
190. See, e.g., Dominic Boyer, The Medium of Foucault in Anthropology, 58 THE MINNESOTA REVIEW
265, 265 (2003) (“Foucault's pervasiveness is largely unparalleled in anthropology, almost to the point
that, like oxygen, one takes his ethereal yet nourishing presence in everyday disciplinary life almost for
granted.”).
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A second rupture should be envisaged at the site of social construction or
interpretation. While it will remain true that legal norms and concepts such
as “fact,” “guilt,” or “justice” ramify differently as local knowledge in local
settings, this insight confers little benefit upon teachers, students, and
practitioners of formal law. The reason for this, identified above in specific
doctrines of tort law, is that spaces for local meaning themselves become
formalized in what I call “legal black boxes” of culture. These spaces serve a
twofold function: (1) maintaining the legitimacy of sovereign power in its
accommodation of difference, and (2) permitting standardization of rules and
their wider application by legal experts in discrete circumstances. If this dual
process requires expertise in order to operate, it has no problem generating a
vast corps of experts in law schools across North America, England, and
Europe. Indeed, the legal education experience prepares students for
precisely this clinical application of law.191 The doctrine learned, therefore,
is inscribed at one level of generality higher than most cultural considerations
in order to allow their subsequent particularized application to specific fact
patterns.
This means that the social constructed-ness of legal meaning is already
built into modern doctrinal law. Attention to it, as much legal ethnography
of late aims to create, is less productive than it once was. Today, lawyers
know tacitly or openly that they are engaged in mythologies and fictions.192
Signaling this does little to alter the way that lawyers, jurists, and judges give
meaning to people’s problems in ways that often feel like resolution. If this
observation is significant it is only because, at the end of the day,
contingency of the “Real,” and acknowledgement thereof, does not resolve
what people experience as practical, material problems. Law, in other words,
is a contingent social institution that acts in and upon a contingent social
field, but it is rarely experienced as such when human bodies and lives are at
stake.
VII. CONCLUSION
Taking these suggestions seriously, legal ethnography could reorient its
gaze. But, if privileging disciplinary power has led field research away from
191. See Mertz, supra note 101; see also Bix, supra note 5, at 983. In relevant part, Bix stated:
Legal education is relevant to questions about the autonomy of law, not only in the sense
that this is the context in which forms of legal reasoning are passed on within the profession,
but also because the training itself may express the forms of knowledge and decisionmaking that are considered distinctive for law, or at least for one particular legal system.
Id.
192. See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory, 10 TEL-AVIV UNIV. STUD.
IN LAW 35 (1991).
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institutions, spaces, and inscriptions of formal law, the solution might not be
a complete return to studies of sovereign power at locations such as the
legislature, courthouse, law library, or State Bar.193 Yet these sites should
serve as navigational pylons reminding the researcher that while law ramifies
in local settings, it continues to emanate from, and be constrained by,
sovereign authority in these locations. To ignore this is to make a tactical
error with political consequences; it is to suggest speciously that law is
everywhere. While this might have been true in tribal communities (which
anthropology itself undermined), it proved false once those communities
came under colonial rule and once metropolitan sovereign authority
consolidated into nation-states. Under our modern regimes of law in global
governance, the denial of persistent—albeit occulted—sovereign power has
permitted large scale episodes of greed, corruption, violence, and procedural
injustice. One solution, I hold, is to reground ethnographic fieldwork in legal
institutions, doctrine, and enforcement to focus upon the provisionality of
law’s autonomy. If it is not equivalent to culture, and if culture is inscribed
into its rules and excised via legal black boxes, then ethnographic approaches
might explain how the labor-intensive process of this separation succeeds at
the precise sites where sovereign power meets disciplinary power.
Law is not synonymous with culture; it still remains deeply rooted in
governance, institutions, and sovereign authority. As such, it continues to
have profound influence in the lives and bodies of people in ever increasing
scope, and it succeeds in that influence because of what I have called the
occultation of law under global governance. While legal anthropology has
been at times a great interlocutor in discussions of law and society, its recent
inability to capture the interplay of formal law with everyday meanings and
practices has led to its marginalization among legal academics—the
epistemic community most charged with what Llewellyn called the
“questing” aspect of the law jobs.194 With recourse to specific doctrines of
tort law, this article has attempted to show ways in which formal law viewed
emically already “black boxes” problems of cultural difference and meaning
for practical reasons, so that continued assertion of this is of minimum
consequence to law’s refinement. In pointing this out, my hope has been to
advocate reorientation in fieldwork on law, and to remind legal scholars of
the great potential offered by well-grounded theories and methods in legal
anthropology.

193. See Bix, supra note 5, at 977. This advocacy for a partial return to sites of sovereign power inflects
Bix’s description of law’s relative autonomy. Id.
194. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1375.

